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Abstract
This paper analyses the impact of aid, and its optimal allocation, when conditionality is
ineffective.  It is assumed that the recipient government will implement its own
preferences no matter what.  In this set up, aid can still affect the behavior of a recipient,
not through conditionality but through changing resource constraints.  We analyze the
problem in the tradition of models of optimal non-linear income taxation.  We find that
unconditional aid increases national income and makes the poor better off in the recipient
country, but that there is a crowding out effect as the recipient country reduces labor
supply in response to increased aid.  On optimal allocation of aid across countries, we
find that poorer countries should get more aid, as should countries with governments that
are more inequality averse, which conforms to intuition.  However, a striking finding is
that more unequal countries should get less aid.
JEL classification codes H21;O19
11. INTRODUCTION
Dissatisfaction with aid has been growing by leaps and bounds. In sharp contrast to
the optimism of earlier evaluations, those of the 1990s have been almost uniformly
negative (e.g., Boone, 1996, World Bank, 1998, Kanbur, Sandler and Morrison, 1999,
Burnside and Dollar, 2000). Much of the discussion has focused on the failure of aid
conditionality (see Kanbur, 2000, Killick, 1995, Mosley, Harrigan and Toye, 1995,
Svensson, 2000a, World Bank, 1992).  This literature has highlighted two inescapable
facts. First, the record of aid in helping growth and poverty reduction is disappointing.
And second, this poor record has been established despite aid conditionality, which was
meant to channel resources to productive uses.  On the latter, there is a growing realization
that external donors cannot really change domestic political economy in the medium term
(Devarajan, Dollar and Holmgren, 2001).  Some have argued that donors should accept a
basic truth—the impact of their aid will come mainly through the effects of relaxing the
resource constraints facing the recipient governments. In light of this, aid should be
allocated on the basis of observable indicators that predict the impact of additional
resources (for example, The World Bank, 1998 and Burnside and Dollar, 2000).
This paper takes seriously the conditionality critique. While there is a developing
literature on how conditionality could be “improved” (see for example Svensson, 2000b or
Kanbur, 2000), this paper instead asks two questions. What would be the consequences of
aid for a country if there were no conditionality at all (which many would argue to be the
case de facto, despite de jure conditionality)?  And what would the optimal allocation of
unconditional aid across countries look like?
The central assumption of this paper is that the effects of aid come through the
relaxation of the recipient government’s budget constraint—all other attempts to
“influence” the government are ineffective. Given this increase in its resources, the
government chooses its policy instruments to satisfy its own preferences. These
instruments and preferences can be modeled in as complex a fashion as possible and
necessary for the analysis.  In this paper we model the net effects of the array of policy
instruments at the government’s disposal (e.g., direct and indirect taxes, trade interventions,
different patterns of public expenditure) simply as the choice of a non-linear income tax
and transfer schedule to maximize a welfare function defined on the distribution on
2incomes.  This optimal non-linear income taxation approach, pioneered by James Mirrlees
in his Nobel Prize winning paper (Mirrlees, 1971), captures the central features we are
interested in highlighting:  incentives, inequality, and the effects of different preferences
over income distribution outcomes.  It serves to shed new light on the literature on the
consequences and optimal allocation of aid.
The plan of the paper is as follows.  Section 2 introduces the basic model with a
single recipient government and a single donor, with aid being modeled as an exogenous
increase in the recipient government’s budget constraint.  In this framework, Section 3
considers the consequences of unconditional aid, including the possible “crowding out”
effects of aid as relaxation of the resource constraint feeds through to incentive effects via
the recipient government’s (optimal choice) of the income tax and transfer schedule.  It
presents numerical simulations which give a quantitative handle on the magnitude and
determinants of these effects.  Section 4 turns to the case with two recipient governments
which differ in their tastes and technologies, and characterizes the optimal allocation of aid
where the donor is assumed to maximize a joint welfare function of the two countries in
deciding on the allocation.  Numerical simulations are presented on how inherent
inequality in the two countries, and their tastes for inequality, affect the optimal allocation.
Section 5 concludes the paper with a discussion of areas for further research.
2. THE BASIC MODEL
The simplest model in which incentives, inequality, preferences for equity, and aid
without conditionality can be integrated in a coherent framework, and which can provide
an engine of analysis for the questions we are interested in, turns out to be the Mirrlees
(1971) model of optimal nonlinear income taxation.  In this model there is inherent
inequality because individuals differ in their labor productivities.  The government chooses
a nonlinear income tax and transfer schedule to maximize a welfare function which is in
principle sensitive to inequality, but does so with the added constraint that individuals
choose their labor supply in response to the tax function.  The government must also satisfy
the overall budget balance constraint, with tax revenues equal to outlays.  Aid from the
outside serves to relax this constraint, and therefore affects the whole equilibrium.  Note
that we view this model as the stylized representation of the myriad instruments the
3government has at its disposal.  Each instrument has incentive, revenue and distributional
effects.  We start by laying out the basic model.
There is a continuum of individuals, each having the same preference ordering, which is
represented by a utility function u(x,y) defined  over consumption x and hours worked y, with
ux > 0 and uy < 0 (subscripts indicating partial derivatives).  Individuals differ only in the pre-
tax wage n they can earn.  There is a distribution of n on the interval (l,h) represented by the
density function f(n).  Writing gross income as z = ny and defining
(1) 0)n/z,x(nu/)n/z,x(u)n;z,x(s xy >-=
preferences are taken to satisfy the further (standard) restriction that
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¶
¶
n
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Condition (2) implies that indifference curves in (x,z)-space become flatter the higher is an
individual's wage rate, which in turn ensures that both consumption and gross earnings
increase with the wage rate.
Suppose that the aim of policy in a recipient country can be expressed as maximizing the
following social welfare criterion
(3)      ò=
h
l
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where W(.) is an increasing and concave function of utility.  The government of a recipient
country cannot observe individuals’ productivities and thus is restricted to setting taxes and
transfers as a function only of earnings, T[z(n)].  The government maximizes S subject to the
revenue constraint
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h
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4where in the Mirrlees tradition R is interpreted as the required revenue for essential public
goods.  The more aid a government receives from external sources, the lower is R.  In addition
to the revenue constraint, the government faces incentive compatibility constraints.  These in
turn state that each n individual maximizes utility by choice of hours worked, solving
(5)      ),(max , yxuyx  subject to )(nyTnyx -= ,
where T(.) is the tax/transfer schedule. The problem (5) implies that
(6)       0))(1( =+- yx uztu
where t(z) = T'(z) denotes the marginal tax rate.  Totally differentiating utility with respect to
n, and making use of (6), we obtain the incentive compatibility constraints1
 (7)
n
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Since T = ny-x, we can think of government as choosing schedules y(n) and x(n).  In
fact it is easier to think of it choosing a pair of functions, u(n) and y(n), which maximize
welfare index (3) subject to the conditions of individual maximization (7) and the revenue
requirement  (4).  Omitting details (for an exposition see Tuomala, 1990), the first order
conditions of this problem imply a pattern of marginal rates satisfying
(8) )(/)())(( nfsunnzt nx la-=
where l is the multiplier on the revenue constraint  and
                                                                
    1 (6) is only a necessary condition for the individual's choice to be optimal, but we assume here that it is
sufficient as well.  Assumptions that assure sufficiency are provided by Mirrlees (1976).  Note also that while
(6) presumes an internal solution for y, (7) remains valid even if individuals were bunched at y=0 since, for
them, du/dn=0.
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is the multiplier on the incentive compatibility constraint. This latter satisfies the transversality
conditions
(10) a(l) = a(h) = 0.
Our object is to trace through the consequences of unconditional aid.  In this model,
unconditional aid increases the resource envelope of the government.  It reduces the revenue
that the government needs to raise from the population.  In other words, an increase in aid
decreases R.  The consequences of unconditional aid can in principle therefore be analyzed
through comparative static of the optimum characterized by (8), (9) and (10), with respect to
variations in R.
Unfortunately, however, as is well recognized in the non-linear taxation literature, closed
form analytical results are few and far between. 2  To see the complications that arise, consider
equations (8) and (9), under the simplifying assumptions that uxy = 0 and that the social
welfare function is utilitarian i.e. W' = 1. Then (8)  becomes
(11) )(/)()1(
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2 Equations (8) - (10) lead to the few qualitative conclusions available in this framework (see Tuomala,1990).
It can be shown that the marginal tax rate on income is nonnegative.  This is more striking than it at first looks.
It may very well be optimal to have the average tax rate less than zero, but it is never optimal to subsidize
earnings at margin.  An intuition is that it is cheaper to get people to given indifference curve by reducing
average rate rather than by exacerbating deadweightloss through distorting their labour supply decisions.  It can
also be shown that the marginal tax rate is less than one.  We also have the famous "end point" results.  If wage
distribution is bounded above, then the marginal tax rates at the top is zero.  If it is optimal for least able
individuals to work then the marginal tax rate on least able is zero.  An intuition behind these endpoint results is
that the only reason to have a marginal tax rate differing from zero is to raise an average tax rate above that
point and lower it below i.e. equity considerations.  But at the top is no one to take from and at the bottom there
is no one to give to.  So at the end points only efficiency considerations matter. Numerical solutions (Tuomala,
1990) have shown, however, that these results have very little practical relevance.
6Now (11) does however provide some insight.  First, the term (1+e-1), reflecting also
conventional wisdom, (11) says that, other things equal, the marginal tax rate should be
lower the larger is the compensated elasticity of labour supply, e.  Governments fearing
that disincentive effects are large will tend to set lower marginal rates.
Consider now the shape of the optimal tax schedule.  Will the tax and transfer system
become more or less progressive as aid increases?  Equation (11) suggests that, other things
equal, the marginal tax rate should be lower the denser the population at that point, i.e.
higher f(n).  In other words the more people affected, the higher is  deadweightloss.  On the
other hand for the typical distribution the density weighted by n, nf(n), (e.g., lognormal
distribution) is likely to decline with n above some point suggesting a higher marginal tax
rate on high earners.  These two factors may be seen as reflecting the efficiency side of the
problem.  The term a(n) in turn incorporates distributional concerns.  It measures the social
welfare gain from slightly increasing the marginal tax rate at n and using that extra revenue
to loosen the government 's budget constraint.  This extra revenue can be used to soften the
bite of the revenue requirement, and distributing as a lump sum subsidy to those below n.
The implicit value of this loosening of the revenue constraint is just l, the multiplier on the
constraint. a(n) increases with n for low n and decreases with n for high n.  The turning
point depends on l.  The lower is l, the higher is the n at which the turning point occurs.
Thus as aid increases and the revenue requirement falls, and hence l falls, the range over
which a(n) is increasing stretches further.  Since a(n) affects the marginal tax rate
positively, this means that the range over which the latter increases also stretches further—
at least for this reason. In this sense, therefore, more aid leads to a more progressive tax
structure.
But this is about as far as we can get at this level of generality.  And the above
analysis says nothing about the consequences of increased aid for per capita income in the
country, for pre tax and post tax income inequality, and for the well being of the poor.
However, in the tradition of the non-linear taxation literature, we can provide better
understanding of the form of optimal policy through numerical simulations.  With these
techniques, we can compute post tax income at each level of n, and thus calculate
inequality of pre and post tax income as well as total income, for different values of key
parameters.  The next section takes up this task.
73. THE CONSEQUENCES OF UNCONDITIONAL AID
It should be clear from (11) that the variation of the optimal marginal tax rate with the
level of income is a complex matter, and that comparative statics of inequality and
averages as parameters vary will not be available in closed form.  This is a general feature
on the optimal nonlinear income taxation literature (see Tuomala, 1990) where, following
the lead of Mirrlees (1971) numerical calculations have proved useful in generating useful
results3.  We follow this route here.  Our focus is on the consequences of varying R and
varying the standard deviation of n.  How do the consequences of aid play out in societies
of differing degrees of “inherent” inequality?
We assume n to be distributed lognormally with parameters m and s (see Atichison and
Brown, 1957).  This assumption is common in the literature, following Mirrlees (1971).  For
numerical simulations we choose s = 0.39, 0.7 and 1 as a standard deviation of n and mean n
= 0.4.  The calculations were carried out for the following CES utility function
(12)
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where the elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure, denoted by e, is 0.5.  The
social welfare function of the recipient government is specified4 as ueuW b
b
--= 1)( so that
ß measures the degree of inequality aversion in the social welfare function of the recipient
government (in the case of ß = 0, we define W = u).  R is specified as a fraction of national
income, and is assumed to vary between -0.3 and 0.0.  In other words, we consider external
aid varying from zero to 30 percent of national income.
  Tables 1-5 show comparative statics of the optimal tax schedule with respect to revenue
requirement with different inherent inequality and inequality aversion.  The Tables give net
income, gross income and optimal marginal tax rates at various percentiles of the ability
                                                                
 3Tuomala (1990) gives details of the computational procedure.
    4For further discussion on the transformation of each individual's utility see Tuomala (1990).
8distribution.  Moreover they give the net income and welfare of the poorest5 and “crowding
out” effect of  unconditional aid.  With no incentive effects, national income should increase
by the same amount as aid.  With incentive effects, this increase may be less—this is what we
call “crowding out”.
Table 1 (base run)
Comparative Static with Respect to R with  s = 0.39
e = 0.5 ß = 0 s= .39
F(n) R = 0.0 xo=0.09 uo=-11 R=-.1 xo=0.09  uo=-10 R=-.27 xo=0.12 uo=-8.3
x z MTR% x z MTR% x z MTR%
0.10 0.16 0.12 44 0.17 0.12 41 0.19 0.11 37
0.50 0.21 0.20 41 0. 22   0.22 39 0.24 0.19 35
0.90 0.29 0.33 35 0.30 0.30 33 0.32 0.31 31
0.99 0.39 0.48 29 0.41 0.47 23 0.42 0.44 25
Average 0.22 0.22 0.23 0.21 0.25 0.20
Crowding out 4.5% 4.8%
Effect
xo is the net income of the poorest person, uo is the welfare of poorest person
                                                                
5 With the utility function we use, there is “bunching”—all those below a critical value of n choose not to
work. Their pre tax income is thus zero and their post tax income is whatever the optimal tax and transfer
regime gives them. This, then, is the net income of the poorest person, xo, as shown in the Tables.
9Table 2
Comparative Static with Respect to R with s  = 0.7
e = 0.5 ß = 0 s= .7
F(n) R = 0.0 xo=0.13 uo=-8 R=-07 xo=0.13  uo=-7.7 R=-.17 xo=0.15 uo=-6.8
x z MTR% x z MTR% x z MTR%
0.10 0.16 0.06 56 0.16 0.06 55 0.18 0.05 51
0.50 0.20 0.17 60 0.21 0.17 59 0.22 0.16 57
0.90 0.31 0.45 57 0.32 0.44 56 0.34 0.42 55
0.99 0.54 0.91 41 0.54 0.88 45 0.55 0.85 47
Average 0.22 0.22 0.23 0.22 0.25 0.21
Crowding out  1.4% 3.7%
Effect
Table 3
Comparative Static with Respect to R with s  = 1.0
e = 0.5 ß = 0 s= 1.0
F(n) R = 0.0 xo=0.16 uo=-6.2 R=-.1 xo=0.17  uo=-5.8 R=-.19 xo=0.19 uo=-5.4
x z MTR% x z MTR% x z MTR%
0.10 0.17 0.02  55 0.18 0.02 53 0.19 0.02 50
0.50 0.21 0.14  68 0.23 0.13 67 0.24 0.12 65
0.90 0.35 0.55  71 0.36 0.58 69 0.39 0.56 68
0.99 0.70 1.61  58 0.75 1.60 52 0.75 1.54 55
average 0.24 0.24 0.26 0.23 0.27 0.23
Crowding out  4.1% 3%
effect
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Table 4
Comparative Static with Respect to R with ß = 1
e = 0.5 ß = 1 s=0.39
F(n) R = 0.0 xo=0.12 uo=-8.3 R=-.1 xo=0.13  uo=-7.7 R=-.28 xo=0.15 uo=-6.7
x Z MTR% x z MTR% x z MTR%
0.10 0.16 0.10  65 0.17 0.09 62 0.19 0.09 56
0.50 0.19 0.19  59 0.20 0.18 56 0.23 0.17 52
0.90 0.26 0.33  47 0.27 0.32 45 0.29 0.30 43
0.99 0.36 0.50  29 0.38 0.49 28 0.39 0.46 32
average 0.20 0.20 0.21 0.19 0.24 0.19
Crowding out  3% 2.6%
effect
Table 5
Comparative Static with Respect to R with ß = ¥ (maximin)
  e = 0.5 maximin s=0.39
F(n) R = 0.0 xo=0.14 uo=-7.1 R=-.1 xo=0.15  uo=-6.7 R=-.19 xo=0.15 uo=-6.7
x z MTR% x z MTR% x z MTR%
0.10 0.14 0.05 85 0.15 0.04 84 0.16 0.03 83
0.50 0.17 0.18 69 0.19 0.17 67 0.20 0.17 66
0.90 0.24 0.24 51 0.25 0.33 50 0.26 0.32 48
0.99 0.34 0.51 32 0.35 0.50 30 0.37 0.49 26
average 0.19 0.19 0.20 0.18 0.21 0.17
Crowding out 5.2% 5.5%
Effect
Tables 1-5 show that there is indeed a crowding out effect as increased unconditional aid
reduces labor supply incentives in the recipient country.  This effect is always greater than 1
percent of total income, but can be as large as 5 percent.  However, despite this crowding out,
total consumption in the recipient country does indeed increase with aid.  Moreover, net
income and welfare of the poorest also increase with aid.
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Consider now the progressivity of the domestic tax structure as a function of aid.  Tables
1-5 show that optimal tax/transfer systems become more progressive when inequality
increases, s = 0.7 and 1.0, and when R becomes more negative (i.e. aid increases).  To
understand this, we can combine the results of two earlier studies. Kanbur-Tuomala (1994)
show that with greater inherent inequality optimal marginal tax rates increase with income
over the majority of the population.  On the other hand we know from Immonen-Kanbur-
Keen-Tuomala (1998) that as the revenue requirement becomes negative so that for example
foreign aid is available the minimum income requirement for the poor can be met without
clawing back revenue with a high marginal tax rate.  Thus we have low marginal tax rates on
the poor.  In other words, optimal progressivity, taking into account incentive effects,
increases with higher inherent inequality and with additional aid resources.
4. OPTIMAL AID ALLOCATION
The previous section analyzed the consequences of unconditional aid for a given
recipient.  Suppose now that the donor is faced with two potential recipients, countries A
and B, with their own specific characteristics.  Any given aid allocation between the two
recipients leads to consequences in each country along the lines laid out in Section 2—each
recipient government chooses its policies in light of its technology, tastes and aid
allocation.  The donor now has the task of choosing the aid allocation from a fixed pool of
aid resources, to optimize the donor’s own welfare function. This is the problem that is set
up and solved in this section.
 Let the donor’s welfare function be
(13) dnnfnvWS i
i
iiD )())((å ò= q ;
where SD is the donor’s valuation function which is not necessary the same as Wi and  qi is
a fraction of the world's population in country i (= A and B).  Thus we assume that the
donor's preferences in inequality aversion may differ from preferences of recipient
countries.  The simplest representation of the donor’s problem is to find bi maximizing (13)
subject to  .bbi
i
i =åq  where b is a fixed pool of aid resources.  Hence, the donor simply
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chooses the optimal allocation of the aggregate aid, b, over the two countries.  This requires
equating across countries the marginal social cost of raising an additional unit of aid, so
that
(14) lA = lB = l,
 where l is the marginal social cost of donor funds.
We are interested in how the optimal allocation responds to key parameters of one the
two countries, including (i) increase in the mean productivity, (ii) increase in inherent
inequality and (iii) increase in inequality aversion.  What will happen to the aid allocation?
It should be clear from our discussion above that the comparative static are not available in
closed form.  Rather, we will have to rely on numerical calculations.  The calculations are
carried out using the same specification for the utility function, density function and social
welfare as in section 3.
 We start with the case where the two countries are identical.  In this case optimal
allocation of aid is to divide the total aid equally between the two countries A and B.  This
is shown in Table 6.  Then we conduct a sequence of experiments, one at a time.  The
computations are shown in Tables 6, 7, 8a,b, 9 and 10a,b.  The Tables give marginal and
average tax rates at various percent points of the n-distribution, and the optimal distribution
of aid across countries, for some variation from the base case of identical countries.  To
limit the number of variations, we keep population size of the two countries identical—it is
in any case obvious that as the relative population size of one country increases, ceteris
paribus its aid allocation should also increase.
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                                               Table 6
           Identical Countries A and B
lA = lB = 18, fA=fB (mi = -1.0,si = 0.39), ßA = ßB =0
F(n) ATR MTR Distribution of aid across
countries
A B
0.10 -47 42 0.50 0.50
0.50 -12 39
0.90 7 34
0.99 14 28
       Table 7
               Decrease in the Mean Productivity of Country A
lA = lB = 18, fA(mA = -1.2,sA = 0.39) fB(mB = -1.0,sB = 0.39), ßA=ßB = 0
F(n) ATR MTR Distribution of aid across
countries
A B
0.10 -100 34 0.82 0.18
0.50 -47 33
0.90 -16 30
0.99 -2 25
Table 8a
                    Increase in the Inequality of Country A
lA = lB = 18, fA(mA = -1.0,sA = 0.5) fB(mB = -1.0,sB = 0.39), ßA=ßB = 0
F(n) ATR MTR Distribution of aid across
countries
A B
0.10 -77 48 0.46 0.54
0.50 -14 48
0.90 15 43
0.99 24 36
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                                          Table 8b
                    Increase in the Inequality of Country A
lA = lB = 18, fA(mA = -1.0,sA = 0.7) fB (mB  = -1.0,sB = 0.39), ßA=ßB = 0
F(n) ATR MTR Distribution of aid across
countries
A B
0.10 -100 56 0.02 0.98
0.50 -16 60
0.90 30 58
0.99 41 50
 Table 9
Increase in the Relative Inequality Aversion of Country A (maximin)
lA = lB = 18, fA (mA = -1.0,sA = 0.39) = fB (mB = -1.0,sB = 0.39), ßB = 0
F(n) ATR MTR Distribution of aid across
countries
A B
0.10 -100 81 0.83 0.17
0.50 -45 63
0.90 4 46
0.99 16 32
    Table 10a
Decrease in the Mean Productivity and Increase in the Inequality of Country A
lA = lB = 18, fA(mA = -1.2,sA = 0.5) fB (mB  = -1.0,sB = 0.39), ßA=ßB=0
F(n) ATR MTR Distribution of aid across
countries
A B
0.10 -100 41 0.82 0.18
0.50 -50 42
0.90 -6 40
0.99 9 35
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   Table 10b
Increase in the Mean Productivity and Increase in the Inequality of Country A
lA = lB = 18, fA (mA = -1.2,sA = 0.7) fB (mB = -1.0,sB = 0.39), ßA=ßB= 0
F(n) ATR MTR Distribution of aid across
countries
A B
0.10 -100 49 0.76 0.24
0.50 -56 55
0.90 13 54
0.99 30 48
From table 7 we see that the optimal share of aid received by country A goes up when
its mean productivity goes down.  In other words the poorer country should get more aid
This is something we might expect.  But the impact of inherent inequality on optimal aid
allocation is not quite so obvious.  Our numerical calculations produce a striking result.
For the parameter values used here, the country with the greater inherent inequality should
get less in the way of unconditional aid (see Tables  8a and b).  What might be an ex-
planation of this result? There are two forces pulling in opposite directions.  For any given
mean income, greater inequality means the poor are poorer so the need of the country is
greater.  However, with greater inequality, less of any unconditional aid will get to the
poor.  These effects are further mediated by the fact that the recipient government is
choosing a tax and transfer schedule.  Our numerical calculations resolve these forces
sharply—the more unequal country should get less aid.  However, a country with greater
inequality aversion should get more aid, as might be expected—this is shown in Table 9.
Finally, Tables 10a and b show cases in which mean productivity decreases and inequality
increases simultaneously in country A.  We see that for the parameter values used here the
former effects dominates, and its share of aid goes up.
5. CONCLUSION
If aid conditionality worked, donors could influence recipients’ use of funds to pursue
more egalitarian objectives than they otherwise would.  But aid conditionality does not
seem to work, or at least does not work very well.  Thus the only reliable lever donors have
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is that of augmenting the total resource envelope of recipients and work through the effects
of this on their behavior.  This paper conducts an analysis of such unconditional aid in the
framework of optimal nonlinear income taxation, which takes into account incentive effects
on governments of recipient countries in choosing policies, and the incentive effects of
their citizens in responding to these policies.
We find that unconditional aid increases overall welfare of the recipient country,
which is not surprising.  It also increases the welfare of the poorest in the recipient country.
More aid induces more progressive tax and transfer systems to be optimally chosen by the
recipient government.  There is, however, a “crowding out” effect as the extra resources
reduce incentives to supply labor in the recipient country—this effects ranges from 1 to 5
percent of GDP.
When there are two potential recipient countries for a given pool of aid, the optimal
allocation of aid depends on their relative characteristics.  The poorer country should get
more aid, as should the country which has higher inequality aversion.  What about the
effect of inherent inequality?  There are two forces pulling in opposite directions.  For any
given mean income, greater inequality means the poor are poorer so the need of the country
is greater.  However, with greater inequality, less of any unconditional aid will get to the
poor.  Our numerical calculations produce striking result.  For the parameter values used
here, the country with the greater inequality should get less in the way of unconditional aid.
Further research suggests itself in bridging the gap between our assumption of totally
unconditional aid, and the opposite assumption of perfect conditionality. In the framework
developed here, imperfect conditionality might mean, for example, that the donor could
enforce a minimum income level for the poor but could not control the entire tax-transfer
schedule.  Or we could think of the aid received being split into two categories, one with
perfect conditionality and the other with total non-conditionality.  The relative proportion
of resources going to each could then be varied parametrically.  In any event, the brute
facts of the failure of conditionality mean that at least some aspects of unconditional aid
will have to be introduced into the analysis and design of development assistance.
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